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BIOLOGICALLY FRAMED SCHIZOPHRENIA AS A BARRIER TO BELIEF IN 
FREE WILL 
 
Nicholas L. Ortiz 
 
Biologically framing mental illness has certain influences on social-psychological 
processes related to morality and retribution. The attribution of moral responsibility is 
thwarted when others believe a transgressor has biologically caused mental illness. Belief 
in free will works as a function for attributing moral responsibility, which represents an 
intimate, interdependent connection between both concepts. The current study tested 
whether or not telling participants a transgressor has biologically caused schizophrenia 
reduces the belief she is morally responsible, has free will, and reduces general belief in 
free will. Results found partial evidence to show biologically framing a transgressor’s 
schizophrenia can diminish belief in free will and moral responsibility. Implications of 
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Accepting biological causes of mental illness continues to grow among the public, 
especially for schizophrenia (Reavley & Jorm, 2014; Schomerus, Matschinger, & 
Angermeyer, 2006). Individuals are more likely to consider genetic and neurochemical 
causes of schizophrenia than they are with other mental illness (Angermeyer & 
Matschinger, 2003; Scior & Furnham, 2016). Biological framings of mental illness affect 
how individuals hold the afflicted responsible for their actions, specifically 
immoral/criminal acts. Individuals hold transgressors less morally responsible for their 
misdeeds when it is known they have mental illness caused by a genetic factor rather than 
an environmental factor, such as being abused as a child (Monterosso, Royzman, & 
Schwartz, 2005). Biologically framing mental illness can also mitigate punishment 
toward transgressors (Shariff et al., 2014). 
Both moral responsibility and punishment are conceptually connected with each 
other. Both are dependent on belief in free will. Belief in free will promotes personal 
accountability and prosocial behavior while also deterring antisocial behavior 
(Baumeister & Brewer, 2012). Belief in free will is a function for holding transgressors 
morally responsible for their misdeeds, thus belief in free will predicts the attribution of 
moral responsibility. This, in turn, justifies the use of appropriate punishment (Clark et 
al., 2014). Higher belief in free will promotes prosocial behavior (MacKenzie, Vohs, & 
Baumeister, 2014), while weakening belief in free will promotes antisocial behavior, such 




2009). A new theoretical model of free will has been introduced by social psychologists, 
which is connected to the idea free will functions as justification for holding wrongdoers 
morally responsible (Baumeister, 2008). 
This concept, called choice-capacity, defines free will as having control over 
one’s conscious ability to think and act without other influence or manipulation (Monroe 
& Malle, 2010). The term “choice-capacity” indicates having self-control also means 
someone has alternative choice(s). Belief in free will entails the choice to behave or think 
in any given way; the choice is one’s own. An individual with free will also has the 
capacity to choose another alternative behavior or thought (Baumeister & Monroe, 2014). 
A young student may see the opportunity to cheat on a test and get away with it; with no 
internal/external manipulations influencing her, she is able to use her volition and decide 
to cheat, or she can also choose the alternative and not cheat. This scenario exemplifies 
the choice-capacity model of free will. 
Free will as choice-capacity reflects the social function it plays in holding others 
accountable for their thoughts and behavior. Free will as having choice or alternative 
possibilities works as a straightforward concept people use in their daily lives to 
understand why others behave or think the ways they do, especially in terms of 
attributing moral responsibility (Monroe, Dillon, & Malle, 2014). If there is evidence a 
transgressor consciously made the choice to commit an immoral act (i.e. had free will 
while committing the immoral act), there is justification for holding the individual 




characterized by the idea she had alternative choices, and the immoral behavior was not 
an immanent one. 
Some factors can be barriers to holding others morally responsible. Biologically 
framing the causes of schizophrenia mitigates blaming those ailed for having the illness 
itself (Haslam & Kvaale, 2015; Kvaale, Gottdiener, & Haslam, 2013a). Biologically 
explaining immoral behavior inhibits the attribution of moral responsibility. Knowing a 
transgressor has a genetic illness, for example, weakens one’s ability to fully hold the 
transgressor responsible for his behavior (Monterosso et al., 2005). No research, to the 
best of my knowledge, has specifically focused on how free will and moral responsibility 
may be affected by biologically framing perceptions of schizophrenia. 
If biologically framing bad behavior obstructs both moral responsibility and 
punishment, it would be rational to suggest free will is affected as well (Meynen, 2010). 
Belief in free will is a prerequisite for attributing moral responsibility. That is, one must 
believe a transgressor acted using his own free will in order to hold him morally 
responsible for his transgression. The obstruction of moral attribution would suggest free 
will is weakened (Clark et al., 2014). 
While the shift in public perception toward those with schizophrenia inhibits 
blame for being ailed, it also leads to certain negative outcomes, such as fear and 
avoidance toward those with schizophrenia (Dietrich, Matschinger, & Angermeyer, 
2006). People believe having schizophrenia is positively associated with dangerous, 
unpredictable behavior (van ’t Veer, Kraan, Drosseart, & Modde, 2006). These 




schizophrenia’s free will is suppressed by biological factors. Individuals under the 
impression a person with schizophrenia lacks volition may believe she is also dangerous 
and unpredictable, which could likely lead to fear and avoidance. 
A biological understanding of schizophrenia will continue to grow, which 
suggests a dubious future for those ailed. The need to understand how biologically 
framing mental illness affects people’s views toward those with schizophrenia is 
necessary. The current study tested whether or not biologically framing schizophrenia 






Growing Familiarity with Biological Causes of Schizophrenia 
A biological perspective of mental health continues to grow among the public 
(Schnittker, 2008). People more often believe genetic/hereditary and neurochemical 
factors are causes of mental illness than in the 1990s (Reavley & Jorm, 2014). One 
reason for this trend is the growing influence of neuroscience in social media and the 
medical field (Haslam, 2011; O’Connor, Rees, & Joffe, 2012). People had commonly 
believed the causes of mental illness are due to environmental/psychosocial factors (e.g. 
stress at work), while dismissing the idea mental health is biologically based. 
Accepting a biological basis is also illness-specific. People are more likely to 
attribute the cause of schizophrenia to genetics or a neurochemical imbalance than they 
do for other mental illness. Individuals, for example, attribute biologically based factors 
to schizophrenia more so than intellectual disability (Scior & Furnham, 2016) and 
depression. Individuals tend to believe major depression is caused by psychosocial 
factors, such as major life events or stress at work (Angermeyer & Matschinger, 2003; 
Dietrich, Beck, Bujantugs, Kenzine, Matschinger, & Angermeyer, 2004). People are 
twice as likely to endorse biological causes of schizophrenia than major depression 




Contemporary Belief in Free Will and Moral Responsibility 
The current study also examines the intimate relationship between moral 
responsibility and belief in free will. The choice-capacity model defines free will as the 
capability (i.e. capacity) to make decisions using one’s own volition, without any internal 
or external manipulation (Monroe & Malle, 2010; Nahmias, Shepard, & Reuter, 2014). 
Individuals associate free will with having choices or alternative possibilities. People are 
more confident in their actions when they believe they had the choice to act (Feldman, 
Baumeister, & Wong, 2014). Having alternative possibilities is an essential characteristic 
of free will, as it shows a person is not constrained or manipulated by other external 
factors where only one option is possible (Baumeister, 2008; Meynen, 2010). 
Self-control is also related to having free will (Monroe et al., 2014) and is another 
fundamental component to the choice-capacity model (Baumeister, 2008; Lavazza & 
Inglese, 2015). Research supports this rationale. Reducing belief in free will weakens 
self-control (Rigoni, Kühn, Gaudino, Sartori, & Brass, 2012) and diminishes self-agency, 
or the idea one is in control of her thoughts and behavior (Lynn, Muhle-Karbe, Aarts, & 
Brass, 2014). 
Moral responsibility. Moral responsibility is often conceptualized in terms of 
how it relates to free will. Moral responsibility focuses on holding others accountable for 
their behavior, as their actions were based on their own conscious choice to engage in the 
behavior (Kozuch & McKenna, 2015). The concept responsible autonomy connects 




capability to make conscious decisions while acknowledging such freedom requires the 
understanding one is self-governing (Baumeister & Monroe, 2014). Free will and moral 
responsibility work, in part, at a societal level to promote cooperation and prosocial 
behavior by reminding people of their own accountability (Baumeister, 2008; Clark et al., 
2014). Free will reminds individuals their actions have consequences. 
Several studies support this concept. Disbelief in free will increases aggressive 
behavior, reduces helpfulness (Baumeister et al., 2009), and facilitates cheating (Vohs & 
Schooler, 2008). Increasing belief in free will promotes gratitude (Mackenzie et al., 2014) 
and reduces prejudiced beliefs toward racial outgroups (Zhao, Liu, Zhang, Shi, & Huang, 
2014). These results serve as strong evidence free will promotes prosocial behavior by 
reminding people of their own responsible autonomy. When people are under the 
impression they do not have free will, they feel less responsible for their actions, which is 
related to an increase in bad behavior. Self-accountability is thwarted when the belief in 
free will is weakened. 
Consequences of Biologically Based Public Perceptions of Schizophrenia 
One consequence of biologically framing perceptions of mental illness is it 
mitigates attribution of responsibility for being ailed (Kvaale, Haslam, & Gottdiener 
2013b; Rüsch, Todd, Bodenhausen, & Corrigan, 2010). Individuals are less willing to 
blame others for having schizophrenia when it is introduced as a biological illness, rather 




Arens, Berger, & Rief, 2008). Framing schizophrenia as a chemical imbalance can even 
reduce self-blame for being ailed (Deacon & Baird, 2009). 
Under most conditions, people are motivated to hold transgressors morally 
responsible for their behavior, sanctioning punitive measures when necessary to promote 
social cohesion (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Clark et al, 2014; Ditto, Pizarro, 
& Tannenbaum, 2009). Knowing a transgressor has a biologically caused mental illness, 
however, is a barrier to holding him morally responsible for his actions, even for 
unscrupulous acts. Individuals are less likely to hold even a murderer fully culpable when 
his actions are explained biologically rather than psychosocially (Monroe et al., 2014; 
Monterosso et al., 2005). 
Belief in Free Will and Biological Schizophrenia  
Knowing a transgressor has a biologically caused illness limits attribution of 
moral responsibility. This leads to the question: Is belief in free will also affected when 
biologically framing schizophrenia? If free will is intimately connected to moral 
responsibility, and biologically framing mental illness mitigates the attribution of 
responsibility, is belief in free will weakened? 
No research I am aware of focuses on whether or not biologically framing 
schizophrenia mitigates the belief those with schizophrenia have free will. I believe free 
will likely plays a role in past findings showing biologically framed mental illness blocks 
the attribution of moral responsibility. First, there is already research showing biological 




al., 2014). Free will functions as a prerequisite for the attribution of moral responsibility 
and the justification of punishment. If there is evidence to show this, it would be logical 
free will would also be diminished. The inability to hold a transgressor morally 
responsible would suggest the transgressor was not in control of her behavior. She, in 
other words, did not have complete free will. This is clear because attributing moral 
responsibility requires the belief the transgressor has free will (Clark et al., 2014). 
The mere consideration of one’s own physiological state can be enough to inhibit 
belief in free will. Feelings of sexual desire, physical fatigue, and the desire to relieve 
one’s bladder can weaken belief in free will. Those with epilepsy and panic disorder, 
illnesses characterized by a lack of self-control, report less belief in free will than those 
without such illnesses (Ent & Baumeister, 2014). Similar results have shown focusing on 
physiological processes (e.g. heart rate) reduces the desire to hold a transgressor morally 
responsible (Gray, Knobe, Sheskin, & Bloom, 2011). When individuals consider 
themselves and others as tangible, complex physiological system, their willingness to 
believe in free will and attribute moral responsibility is diminished. People believe 
transgressors have less self-control or free will when behavior is explained using 
neuroscientific evidence (Cheung & Heine, 2015; Schooler, Nadelhoffer, Nahmias, & 
Vohs, 2014). Behavior from this perspective is based more on biological, automatic 
behavior than free will. 
Describing schizophrenia as a brain or hereditary disease leads to the belief those 
with schizophrenia lack self-control (Dietrich et al., 2006). Describing mental illness in 




punishment toward transgressors with mental illness (Shariff et al., 2014). The 
justification of punishment for bad behavior is dependent on knowing the accused had 
free will and is morally responsible for the transgression (Clark. et al., 2014). Although 
individuals are motivated to hold transgressors morally responsible and punish them, 
biologically framing mental illness mitigates these processes. 
While no research has focused on schizophrenia as a possible threat to free will, 
one study focused on biologically related mental illness as a direct threat to belief in free 
will. Monroe et al. (2014) found participants attributed lower choice-capacity, self-
control, and free will to a transgressor if his behavior was attributed to a brain disease. 
This work found choice-capacity and acting with intent are positively associated with 
belief in free will. More importantly, explicitly depicting immoral behavior being caused 
by a brain disease, not the transgressor himself, can obstruct belief in free will. These 
findings suggest biologically framing schizophrenia obstructs belief in free will. 
The current study used the theoretical relationship between moral responsibility 
and increased belief in free will to test the potential effect biologically framing 
schizophrenia has on moral responsibility and two forms of belief in free will. By having 
individuals consider immoral behavior, they are motivated to hold a transgressor morally 
responsible, which influences them to believe in free will. People have higher belief in 
free will when they consider immoral behavior than morally neutral behavior (Clark et 
al., 2014). I believe telling people a transgressor has biologically caused schizophrenia 
will be enough for people to believe this transgressor’s free will is diminished. This 




motivated to hold transgressors responsible and believe they have free will. Ultimately, 





Statement of the Problem 
This study asks whether or not knowing a transgressor has schizophrenia largely 
caused by a neurochemical imbalance weakens belief in free will. This question is 
important for two reasons. First, it would test for empirical evidence showing biologically 
framing public perceptions of schizophrenia mitigates belief in free will. Second, 
diminished belief in free will may explain avoidance, perceived dangerousness, and fear 
toward those with schizophrenia. 
Individuals report anger and uneasiness toward those with schizophrenia more 
than those with depression. They also believe those with schizophrenia are more 
aggressive and dangerous than depressed people (Angermeyer & Matschinger, 2003; 
Schomerus, Matschinger, & Angerymeyer, 2014). Having free will is seen as an essential 
component to being human (Ogletree, Oberle, Harlow, & Bahruth, 2010). The belief a 
person with schizophrenia lacks self-control may suggest those with schizophrenia are 
fundamentally different from the rest of the population. These beliefs could induce 
negative responses toward those with schizophrenia. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. Participants who read descriptions of an immoral act committed by 
a transgressor with schizophrenia caused by a chemical imbalance will show less belief 
the transgressor is morally responsible for her behavior than those who evaluate 




mental health information is provided. No difference in moral responsibility will be 
observed between psychosocial causation and no causal information. 
Hypothesis 2. Participants who read descriptions of an immoral act committed by 
a transgressor with schizophrenia caused by a chemical imbalance will show reduced 
perceptions of the transgressor’s free will than those who evaluate descriptions of a 
transgressor with schizophrenia caused by being abused as a child, or when no mental 
health information is provided. No difference in specific belief in free will will be 
observed between psychosocial causation and no causal information. 
Hypothesis 3. Participants who read descriptions of an immoral act committed by 
a transgressor with schizophrenia caused by a chemical imbalance will show reduced 
general beliefs about free will compared to those who read descriptions with a 
transgressor with schizophrenia caused by being abused as a child, or when no mental 
health information is provided. No difference in general belief in free will will be 






Participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups. Participants in each 
group read identical descriptions of an immoral behavior. An initial group (biological) 
was informed the transgressor has schizophrenia caused by a chemical imbalance in the 
brain. A second group (psychosocial) was told the transgressor was abused as a child, 
which caused her schizophrenia. The third group did not receive mental health 
information (control). All participants were asked to report their belief the transgressor 
has free will and was morally responsible for her transgression. 
Participants 
Two hundred forty-five participants were initially recruited using Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and Qualtrics. MTurk is an effective and economic method for 
collecting data (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 
2013). Issues regarding spammers (i.e. fake responses) and bots compromising data were 
approached using attention checks, manipulation checks, and assigned random five-digit 
identification numbers (Mason & Suri, 2011). Fourteen participants failed attention or 
manipulation checks and were omitted from the dataset. 
A total of 231 participants (111 female), with an average age of 39.6 (SD = 12.8, 
range 21-75), were used for final analyses. Seventy-five percent (75.3 percent, n = 174) 
of participants were White (n = 174), 7.8 percent were Asian (n = 18), 7.4 percent were 




were mixed-race (n = 6), and less than 1 percent were Native American (n = 2), 








Demographic Frequency Counts and Percentages 
 Frequency Percentage 
Education   
High School 27 11.7% 
Some College 52 22.5% 
Associate Degree 29 12.6% 
Bachelor’s Degree 99 42.9% 
Graduate Degree 24 10.3% 
Total 231 100.0% 
Political Affiliation   
Democrat 96 41.6% 
Independent 71 30.7% 
Republican 54 23.4% 
None 7 3.0% 
Other 3 1.3% 
Total 231 100.0% 
Group   
Biological 79 34.2% 
Control 77 33.3% 
Psychosocial 75 32.5% 
Total 231 100.0% 
Age   
21-35 112 48.5% 
36-50 71 30.7% 
51-65 37 16.0% 
66-75 11 4.8% 







Measures and Manipulation 
Participants were randomly assigned to read one of three vignettes describing a 
character who either has schizophrenia caused by a chemical imbalance in the brain 
(biological condition), schizophrenia caused by childhood abuse (psychosocial 
condition), or no mental health problems to mention (control). 
Biological condition. Participants in the biological group were asked to read a 
vignette adapted from Phelan (2005) describing a woman with schizophrenia. The 
vignette reads: 
Imagine Anne. She is a single, 25-year-old. Anne usually gets along well with her 
family, friends, and coworkers. She enjoys reading and going out with friends. 
The other day, Anne broke into her neighbor’s home and took several items. Anne 
has schizophrenia. Medical experts believe Anne’s schizophrenia is caused by a 
chemical imbalance in her brain. 
Psychosocial condition. Participants in the psychosocial condition read the same 
vignette used in the biological condition, except the transgressor’s schizophrenia is 
caused by childhood abuse. The vignette reads: 
Imagine Anne. She is a single, 25-year-old. Anne usually gets along well with her 
family, friends, and coworkers. She enjoys reading and going out with friends. 
The other day, Anne broke into her neighbor’s home and took several items. Anne 
has schizophrenia. Medical experts believe Anne’s schizophrenia is caused by her 




Control condition. The control condition had participants read the same vignette 
used in the previous conditions, however, no mental health information was provided. 
The vignette reads: 
Imagine Anne. She is a single, 25-year-old. Anne usually gets along well with her 
family, friends, and coworkers. She enjoys reading and going out with friends. 
The other day, Anne broke into her neighbor’s home and took several items. 
Moral responsibility measure. Participants were asked “how responsible is 
Anne for breaking into her neighbor’s house?” on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not 
at all responsible) to 7 (entirely responsible). 
Belief in free will. Free will was measured in two ways, participants perception 
of the transgressor’s free will capacity and a general measure of belief in free will not 
specific to any individual (i.e. general belief in free will). 
Transgressor’s free will. Participants were asked how much they agree or 
disagree “[the vignette character] has free will” using a seven-point scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
General belief in free will. Participants completed the Free Will (FW) subscale of 
the FAD-Plus (Paulhus & Carey, 2011a, 2011b). The FW subscale is composed of seven 
items, each rated on a five-point scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree). An example 
of scale items is a question asking participants how much they agree or disagree “people 
have complete free will”. The FW subscale showed acceptable internal consistency ( = 




item was included at the end of the FW subscale. Participants who failed this attention 
check were not considered for analyses. 
Manipulation checks. Participants were asked two questions to make sure the 
manipulation phase was successful. First, participants in the biological and psychosocial 
condition were asked “what caused [the character vignette’s] schizophrenia?” 
Participants answered using a multiple-choice question (severe childhood abuse, car 
accident, chemical imbalance in the brain). Second, all participants were asked “what did 
[the character vignette] do that was immoral?”. Participants answered using a multiple-
choice question (beat up a convenience store clerk, broke into and stole from neighbor’s 
home, took money from her boss). Participants who failed these manipulation checks 
were omitted from analyses. 
Procedure 
Manipulation phase. Following consent, participants were randomly assigned to 
read one of the three vignettes. Each group was informed the vignette character had 
broken into and stolen from her neighbor’s house. 
Measures of responsibility and belief in free will. Participants then completed 
the moral responsibility measure, followed by both measures of free will (transgressor’s 
free will then general belief in free will). Once completing these measures, participants 






Data were imported into R version 3.5.2. After cleaning data, all hypotheses were 
tested using robust one-way ANOVA and post hoc tests. All three dependent variables 
were substantially skewed (see Table 2). Robust one-way ANOVA approaches and post 
hoc tests were used to test all three hypotheses using protocol from the WRS2 package 
(Mair & Wilcox, 2017). Models for Hypotheses 2 and 3 used a 20 percent trimmed mean 
approach. Hypothesis 1 used a 15 percent trimmed mean, as a 20 percent trimmed mean 
would not allow for the computation of standard error due to a Windsorized variance of 
zero. Multiple comparison tests used the lincon function. Table 3 shows initial untrimmed 
means and standard deviations between conditions for each dependent measure. Table 4 
provides robust omnibus test statistics and associated effect sizes, as well as trimmed 






Skewness and Associated Standard Errors for Moral Responsibility, Specific and General Belief in Free Will 
 M (SD) n Skew (SE) 
Moral Responsibility 5.45 (1.72) 231 −1.04 (3.26) 
Specific Belief in FW 5.64 (1.41) 231 −1.25 (3.93) 
General Belief in FW 3.72 (0.83) 231 −0.63 (1.98) 
Note. Skews and associated standard errors were obtained using the stat.desc function from the pastecs package. Standard 













Moral Responsibility 4.98 (1.43) 4.88 (1.76) 6.49 (1.48) 
Specific Belief in FW 5.34 (1.17) 5.12 (1.50) 6.44 (1.17) 
General Belief in FW 3.54 (0.83) 3.59 (.78) 4.03 (0.78) 






Mean Scores of Moral Responsibility, Specific and General Belief in Free Will Between Experimental Conditions 
  Experimental Condition    
ANOVA Model Biological Psychosocial Control Robust F ES 
























Note. All omnibus statistics significant at p < .001. Standard errors appear in parentheses below means. Means with differing 
subscripts within rows differ significantly at p < .001, based on post hoc multiple comparison tests accounting for familywise 





Psi hat (̂) statistics and their associated 95 percent confidence intervals are 
provided for each hypothesis. The psi hat statistic indicates pairwise trimmed mean 
differences between experimental conditions. Confidence intervals were adjusted for 
multiple comparisons tests. Probability coverage for each confidence interval is 1 − , 
with a familywise error rate of . Hypothesis 1 predicted participants in the biological 
condition would attribute less moral responsibility to the vignette character than 
participants in both the psychosocial and control conditions. No difference in moral 
responsibility between the psychosocial and control conditions were expected. 
Results showed a significant difference in moral responsibility between 
experimental conditions. Participants in the biological (̂ = −1.81, 95% CI [−2.33, 
−1.29]) and psychosocial conditions (̂ = 1.81, 95% CI [1.26, 2.39]) believed the vignette 
character was less responsible for breaking into her neighbor’s home than participants in 
the control condition. No difference in moral responsibility was observed between the 
biological and psychosocial conditions (̂ = −0.01, 95% CI [−0.78, 0.75]). 
Hypothesis 2 predicted participants in the biological condition would have lower 
belief in specific free will than participants in either the psychosocial or control 
conditions. No difference in specific belief in free will was expected between the 
psychosocial and control conditions. Results showed participants in the biological (̂ = 
−1.27, 95% CI [−1.58, −0.97]) and psychosocial conditions (̂ = 1.31, 95% CI [0.87, 




No difference in specific belief in free will was observed between the biological and 
psychosocial conditions (̂ = 0.04, 95% CI [−0.41, 0.49]). 
Hypothesis 3 predicted participants in the biological condition would have less 
belief in general free will than participants in either the psychosocial or control 
conditions. No difference in general belief in free will was expected between the 
psychosocial and control conditions. Findings were similar to those from the first two 
models. Participants in the biological (̂ = −0.51, 95% CI [−0.81, −0.21]) and 
psychosocial conditions (̂ = 0.44, 95% CI [0.15, 0.74]) had less general belief in free 
will than those in the control condition. There was, however, no difference in general 
belief in free will between the biological and psychosocial conditions (̂ = −0.06, 95% CI 
[−0.37, 0.23]). 
Bayes Factor Analysis 
Measures of moral responsibility, specific and general belief in free will from 
participants in the biological and psychosocial conditions were significantly lower than 
those from control participants. Moreover, no significant difference in all three dependent 
measures between the biological and psychosocial conditions were observed. These 
results were surprising and contrary to hypotheses. 
Mean differences in moral responsibility, specific and general belief in free will 
between the biological and psychosocial conditions were examined using Bayes Factor 




differences in all three dependent measures between the biological and psychosocial 
conditions. BF analysis is used as an alternative to classical null hypothesis testing. This 
method provides a quantitative likelihood index of one hypothesis occurring over another 
hypothesis given a certain set of empirical data. For example, a BF ratio of 5.0 indicates 
empirical data are five-times more likely to occur if the alternative hypothesis is true 
rather than if the null hypothesis is true. Ratios were obtained with BF t-tests using the 
‘Bayes Factor’ package. 
The first model tested how likely data support the alternative hypothesis there 
would be a significant difference in the attribution of moral responsibility between the 
biological and psychosocial conditions. Moderate support for the null hypothesis was 
obtained (BF = 0.18), suggesting no meaningful difference in the attribution of moral 
responsibility between both conditions. The second model tested how well the data 
support the alternative hypothesis specific belief in free will would differ between the 
biological and psychosocial conditions. Moderate support for the null hypothesis was 
found (BF = 0.28), indicating no difference in specific belief in free will between 
conditions. 
The final model tested how well the data support the alternative hypothesis 
general belief in free will would differ between the biological and psychosocial 
conditions. Moderate support for the null hypothesis was found (BF = 0.18), suggesting 
no difference in general belief in free will between conditions. These BF ratios support 




specific and general belief in free differed significantly between participants in the 








The current study tested whether or not knowing a transgressor has biologically 
caused schizophrenia weakens belief in free will. Specifically, exposure to a transgressor 
who has schizophrenia caused by a neurochemical imbalance would weaken people’s 
belief in both specific and general belief in free will. Biological causes of schizophrenia 
may evoke the belief behavior is fundamentally based on biological processes, which 
diminishes the role of volition or self-control (Nahmias, 2006). It was also predicted 
knowing a transgressor has biologically caused schizophrenia would mitigate the 
attribution of moral responsibility. Belief in free will works as a function for the 
attribution of moral responsibility (Clark et al., 2014). Mitigation of moral responsibility 
would indirectly indicate a weakening of belief in free will. 
Partial support for all three hypotheses was found. Participants assigned to the 
biological condition had less belief in specific and general free will than those in the 
control condition. Additionally, participants in the biological condition believed the 
vignette character was less morally responsible for her transgression than those in the 
control condition. Two statistical patterns contrary to hypotheses were observed in all 
three models. First, no significant difference in moral responsibility and both measures of 
belief in free will was observed between the biological and psychosocial conditions. 
Second, scores from all three dependent measures were significantly lower in the 




These results were unexpected and may suggest psychosocially framing mental 
illness has the same, or similar, weakening effect biologically framing mental illness has 
on belief in free will. Participants in the psychosocial condition, for example, may have 
felt compassion for the vignette character for having been abused as a child, which 
diminished blame and belief in free will. Psychosocial causes of schizophrenia evoke 
compassion more so than biological causes of schizophrenia (Lebowitz & Ahn, 2014). At 
the same time, participants in the biological condition may have believed the vignette 
character’s chemical imbalance weakened her self-control. Participants in the biological 
condition were reminded human consciousness, including free will, is ultimately based 
on physiologically mechanistic processes (neurochemicals). 
One study looked at differences in the attribution of moral responsibility between 
biological and psychological causes of immoral behavior. Participants were told about an 
immoral act, which was explicitly said to have been caused by either a biological or 
psychosocial causal explanation. Participants provided biological explanations of an 
immoral behavior were no more likely to mitigate the attribution of moral responsibility 
than participants provided with psychosocial explanations of an immoral behavior. These 
findings suggest psychological causes of mental illness can undermine belief in free will 
just as effectively as biological causes of mental illness (De Brigard, Mandelbaum, & 
Ripley, 2009). 
Notwithstanding, work from De Brigard et al. and the current thesis do not 
support the literature. Individuals are less willing to believe a transgressor is 




biologically caused illness rather than a psychosocial illness. For example, people will 
hold a murderer less culpable when his behavior was said to have been caused by a 
biological factor rather than a psychosocial factor (Monterosso et al., 2005). 
Similar literature shows biologically framing mental illness reduces blame for 
being ailed more than psychosocially framing mental illness (Crisafulli, Von Holle, & 
Bulik, 2008; Lincoln et al., 2008). Individuals hold those with depression less morally 
responsible for their illness when it is caused solely by a chemical imbalance rather than 
an interaction between biological and environmental factors (Deacon & Baird, 2009). 
While there is no consensus, the literature suggests biological causes of bad behavior 
reduce the desire to blame more so than psychosocial causes. 
Limitations 
The current research has several methodological limitations. First, this study used 
a United States-based sample. Current results cannot be generalized to populations from 
non-western cultures. What is more, the free will subscale is not considered a gold 
standard for measuring general belief in free will. Though many researchers have used 
this measure and reported its validity and reliability (Paulhus & Carey, 2011b), some 
believe it does not fully measure an accurate, generalized concept of free will, but rather 
a measure of both free will and moral responsibility (Ogletree, 2013). Future researchers 
should consider using multiple measures of belief in free will. Researchers could also 
incorporate the choice-capacity model by operationalizing belief in free will using terms 




Additionally, this study used a convenience sample from an online crowdsourcing 
network. Participants completed surveys using their own devices at their own leisure. 
Some participants may have been distracted while taking the survey (e.g. they were 
simultaneously listening to music or watching television while taking the survey). 
Although attention and manipulation checks were used, other factors could have 
influenced some responses. 
Aside from limitations, current findings provide a call for more investigation on 
biological causes of schizophrenia as a threat to belief in free will. Literature on 
biological causes of mental illness and belief in free will is insufficient, leaving 
researchers little guidance for data interpretation and methodological design. The current 
findings suggest a focus on three main questions for future work. First, does biologically 
framing schizophrenia reduce belief in free will? Current results provide only partial 
support for my hypothesis. 
Second, do psychosocial causal explanations of mental illness reduce moral 
responsibility and belief in free will? The literature suggests biological causes reduce 
blame more so than psychosocial causes, however, research is limited when considering 
belief in free will. I am also not aware of any research specifically looking at 
psychosocial causes of mental illness as possible threats to moral responsibility and belief 
in free will. Researchers have instead focused on comparing blame/responsibility 
between causal explanations of mental illness and immoral behavior. Testing for 
differences in belief in free will between causal factors may require more comprehensive 




Third, if psychosocial causes of schizophrenia reduce belief in free will as 
biological causes do, does this mean psychosocial causes of schizophrenia result in a 
unique effect on belief in free will, or is it both causal explanations share another factor? 
Do biological causal explanations evoke the idea behavior and volition are essentially 
mechanistic, automatic processes, while psychosocial causal explanations evoke 
sympathy or pity? Even if both biological and psychosocial causal explanations of 
schizophrenia reduce belief in free will, would this be the case when considering other 
mental illness, such as addiction or dementia, or even other biological and psychosocial 
causal explanations, such as genetics or life stressors? Future research on biologically 
framed schizophrenia as a barrier to belief in free will depends on the consideration of 
these questions. 
Conclusion 
Biological perspectives of mental illness are unlikely to regress in popularity 
(Goldstein & Rosselli, 2003). The growing influence of neuroscientific evidence among 
the public may have effects on how people asses the accountability and free will of 
others. The belief biological processes co-contribute to human thoughts and behavior 
may grow among the public as neuroscience expands in conjunction with technology, the 
medical field, and media. Those with mental illness are particularly susceptible to this 
idea, especially for those with schizophrenia, where biological causes are already a 




Belief in free will is commonly viewed as a fundamental human quality (Ogletree 
et al., 2010). It is a familiar concept among society, promoting prosocial behavior and 
personal accountability (Clark et al., 2014). The suggestion one does not have free will 
could still be associated with increased fear, social distance, and other negative outcomes 
associated with biologically framing schizophrenia. Before research extends to this issue, 
it is important to first confidently confirm or deny biologically framing mental illness can 
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